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NATURALISING THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL PROBLEM
In this dissertation we investigate two themes around the topic of social relations in
mana gement control structures. We use developments in neuroscience and eye-tracking to
supple ment the traditional psychological and economic perspective on management
accoun ting. 
Process accountability changes processes of judgement and problem solving. Some mental
processes are more difficult to access introspectively than others, and this opacity makes it
troublesome to account for them, even if they are useful for making judgements and
solving problems. Process accountability drives people away from affective judgements and
insight solutions, lowering performance on various tasks. Our findings go against the
received wisdom that accountability improves judgements and decisions. We supply unique
evidence on this shift through EEG and eye-tracking measures.
Neuroscience has recently made important advances on emotion recognition. We use
this theoretical perspective to explain controller behaviour. It is important to know what
determines a controller’s propensity to compromise on integrity under social pressure from
business unit management. We look at the suppression of EEG mu waves in the sensori -
motor cortex while observing emotional facial expressions, and find it explains a substan -
tial part of variation in controllers’ responses to professional dilemmas: those who show
stronger mu suppression are more inclined to yield to managers’ emotional pressure.  
In sum, this dissertation marks an attempt to incorporate into management accounting
research some developments in quickly developing naturalistic fields like neuroscience and
eye-tracking. By using novel methods of measurement and revisiting or replacing traditional
theoretical constructs, we contribute to the movement of naturalising accounting.
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relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
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knowledge.
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ni dejar en la memoria 
de los hombres mi canción 
 
—Antonio Machado,  
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Foreword 
 
 
1 
Where to begin? 
 
2 
I could start with a little personal reflection, a slice of autobiography. This dissertation is 
after all an account of four years of life.  
Then again, there is nothing personal about it. How could there be? It was inevitable. It 
belongs to the great causal order, it was written in the comedy of the stars from the 
beginning, by Him who is called big bang, not by me. 
 
3 
This, incidentally, is the shift of perspective we try to make in this dissertation. 
 
4 
Where to start, then? Well, what would John do?  
En archē ēn o logos kai o logos ēn pros ton theon kai theos ēn o logos—in the 
beginning was the account, and the account was with God, and God was the account. 
 
5 
The oldest known use of logos, this central meeting point of the Greco-Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, is ‘account’. Accounting is as old as writing. 
The oldest known inventor of writing, the Egyptian god Thoth, is the moon. He is also 
the inventor of medicine, magic, numbers, and the calendar, and on behalf of Osiris he 
records the weight of the soul on its passage to the underworld. He is the Accountant of 
Death. 
 
6 
Let me begin, then, by acknowledging my indebtedness to Thoth. Without him, this work 
would have been impossible. 
It would also have been unthinkable without Plato etc. To summarise, let the record 
show my indebtedness to the entire Aegypto-Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition. From this 
tradition was born the zōon logon echon, the animal having logos. 
The accountable animal. 
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And here I am, giving an account. And so I return to autobiography. 
I wish to express my gratitude to all involved in the chain of events that led to this 
dissertation. In the first place I am supremely grateful to my promoter, Prof.dr. Frank 
Hartmann. In many different ways Frank has been a necessary condition in the process. In 
addition to his extensive direct involvement in the research projects, our encounters have 
exercised so much influence on my own thinking that my gratitude must extend not only to 
this dissertation, but also to all conceivable future endeavours. I feel this master-apprentice 
relation really is the most valuable aspect of the PhD trajectory. 
The generous support of ERIM and the Erasmus Trustfonds in realising our projects is 
gratefully acknowledged. A special recognition of the role of the staff of the Erasmus 
Behavioural Lab—Christiaan, Marcel, and Gerrit-Jan—is in order. I thank the Erasmus 
School of Accounting and Assurance, through Jolanda Klos, Hendrik Geerkens, and 
Prof.dr. Cees van Halem, as well as Nyenrode Business University in the person of Prof.dr. 
Roland Speklé, for their kind support in carrying out the research. 
Many others cannot deny responsibility also. My family, obviously. Gijs, in a way this 
work is your child more than mine. Steve, to the tune of cu chiviri I treasure the memory of 
our evening couch sessions. My co-author Wim, I thank you for our pleasant collaboration 
on research, but even more so for our shared appreciation of the German language and 
other funny things. My office mates Tassos and Marcel, always prepared for discussions 
on life and football. I thank all others involved along the way, in the department, in the 
ERIM community, in Rotterdam, Amersfoort, Tilburg, London, and elsewhere. 
Then there’s Dylan, Cohen, Sabina, and Serrat. Above all soars Lionel Messi, who 
scored 240 goals since I started working on this dissertation. 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
Philip Eskenazi 
 
Leusden, 
24 February 2015 
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Chapter 1 
General introduction 
 
 
He who makes a beast of himself 
gets rid of the pain of being a man 
 
—Dr Johnson 
 
 
1.1 Opening move 
 
Our interest in this dissertation lies with organisational relations of accountability. This 
includes all social relations that are part of the management control structure as typically 
studied by organisational scientists. We take the control structure in a very broad sense, 
partly as formal and partly as informal, and including aspects like reporting practices, 
incentive schemes, and the types of discourse dominant in the organisation. This is an 
important theme for management accounting research. A management control structure 
should help solve the agency problem inherent in organisational activities. We investigate 
problems in the solutions to this problem. We look at two such solutions in particular: first, 
we examine the effects of requiring agents to justify their approach to various tasks; and 
second, we study the role of the controller as safeguard of financial reporting integrity. 
We use a range of theoretical and methodological resources to address these issues. 
This includes traditional approaches based on social-psychological theory and behavioural 
experiments, but also more novel and naturalistic devices. In the first place we attempt to 
capitalise on developments in neuroscience. We use electroencephalographic (EEG) 
recording to examine processes in the brain. EEG is temporally accurate, relatively 
affordable, and comfortable and safe for participants. It takes advantage of the fact that 
neurons tend to fire synchronously, leading to large-scale oscillations that can be picked up 
by electrodes applied to the scalp. EEG allows us to measure magnitude of responses as 
well as hemispheric differentiation of activity. In addition we use eye-tracking technology 
to observe oculomotor behaviour. Eye trackers use infra-red cameras to determine the 
position and size of the pupils in relation to a stimulus, allowing the researcher to infer the 
point in space at which the gaze is directed. Both of these measurement methods enable us 
to move closer to studying man as a natural phenomenon. 
A major issue in applying these new approaches to problems in management 
accounting is to bridge naturalistic observations to our theoretical constructs of interest. 
16_Erim Eskenazi.job
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What could be the relation between neuronal firing frequency oscillations and professional 
behaviour? Or between eyes moving to a certain position and the mental processing of a 
word? How does one theorise on causal relations between these levels? This is a great 
challenge, but at the same time it brings an opportunity. New methodologies like 
neuroscience and eye-tracking allow us not just to test the same theories in new ways, but 
to revise our theoretical constructs.  
We will proceed to discuss how this plays out in the three empirical chapters of this 
dissertation. 
 
1.2 Process accountability 
 
Accountability has been studied extensively by social psychologists. They typically use 
behavioural experiments to investigate the effect of accountability on the quality of 
judgements and decisions. An overwhelming proportion of this literature stream indicates a 
positive effect (De Langhe, Van Osselaer, & Wierenga, 2011; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
This is often explained by improved reasoning (Tetlock, 1983, 1985). Accountability 
induces a relatively analytic process of judgement and problem solving (Brtek & 
Motowidlo, 2002; De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Simonson & Nye, 1992; 
Tetlock, 1983). Information is processed more thoroughly, leading to improved 
judgements and decisions. 
In the critical accounting literature accountability is considered from an ethical 
viewpoint. For example, building on Butler (2005), Messner considers problems arising 
from the opacity of the self: “Sometimes, the reasons why somebody has taken a particular 
course of action are not entirely clear to this person herself, such as when a manager makes 
a decision in a rather intuitive way. In such a case, accountability is limited by the opaque 
nature of a person’s experiences and practical engagements. To which extent is it then 
ethically justified to compel the manager to provide a full account for what she is not fully 
conscious of?” (2009, p. 919).  
These two streams of literature do not contradict each other. Social psychologists tend 
to believe accountability is good for performance, as it improves judgements and 
decisions. Critical accounting scholars point out the ethical problems of accountability, 
regardless of its effect on personal or firm performance. Contrary to critical theorists, we 
seek to take an amoral, organisational perspective. However, we can take some leads from 
critical scholars in order to question the received wisdom that accountability improves 
performance. Agents are far from fully aware of how they function, and how they come to 
judgements, decisions, and other behaviour. The need to justify may force agents into more 
17_Erim Eskenazi.job
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transparent processes, even if this does not lead to optimal outcomes. We look at two areas 
in which this is expected to be an acute problem: affective judgement making and insight 
problem solving. 
In Chapter 2 we use recent findings on the role of affect and emotion in judgement 
making to identify circumstances under which we expect process accountability to lead to 
impoverished judgement quality. In making judgements and decisions, an important source 
of information is one’s own affective evaluation. This is related to popular notions of 
sources of decisions like gut feeling, intuition, and premonition. In formal terms, 
judgements based on affect are manifestations of the affect heuristic (e.g. Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Whether the affect heuristic is a suitable way to approach a 
judgement task depends on many factors. Task characteristics are particularly important in 
determining the validity of affect as a judgement cue (McMackin & Slovic, 2000). For 
example, on complex problems with a lot of information, affect-based rather than detail-
based information encoding leads to better decisions (Mikels, Maglio, Reed, & Kaplowitz, 
2011). Importantly, affect is elusive to consciousness and verbalisation, which implies it 
would be difficult for accountable agents to explain and justify the use of the affect 
heuristic in judgements and decisions. Our investigation in Chapter 2 is based on this line 
of thinking. If judgements under accountability are made with reduced use of the affect 
heuristic regardless of how appropriate affect is for the task at hand, then for certain tasks 
accountability will lower judgement quality. We develop a theory to identify the 
circumstances under which this occurs, and test it through three behavioural experiments. 
Our results show that when affect is a valid judgement cue, process accountability 
decreases judgement quality; this effect reverses when affect is not a valid cue. 
Chapter 3 builds on the same logic, but in a different domain: we turn from judgement 
making to problem solving. Our focus is on insight, which is a kind of solution analogous 
to affective judgement to some degree. Just like the opacity of affect to the subject makes 
it difficult to account for affective judgements, insight solutions seem to appear in 
consciousness suddenly and without awareness of the process by which the problem was 
solved (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005). For problems that can be solved 
either by insight or by analytic strategies, we expect accountable agents to tend to analytic 
strategies. As in the case of judgement making, the effect on performance then depends on 
the characteristics of the problem at hand. We test this expectation in three studies again. 
This time, we complement a traditional behavioural experiment with an EEG study and an 
eye-tracking study. This allows us to go beyond behavioural effects and get a unique view 
of the cognitive processing shift associated with accountability. Based on the 
neuropsychological literature we develop a theory on hemispheric differences in verbal 
18_Erim Eskenazi.job
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processing, leading to specific predictions of EEG and oculomotor effects of 
accountability. Our findings indicate that process accountability indeed lowers solving 
rates on a set of problems suitable for insight solutions. The EEG and eye-tracking 
evidence supports our explanation of a processing shift away from insight solving and 
towards analytic strategies. 
 
1.3 Controller roles 
 
In Chapter 4 we look at controllers as the safeguards of financial reporting integrity
1
. In a 
setting where a corporation consists of multiple business units (BU) with some degree of 
independence, BU managers often have an incentive for misreporting (San Miguel & 
Govindarajan, 1984). For example, the remuneration or chances on promotion of BU 
managers may be based on reported results. The role of the controller is a solution to this 
agency problem. BU controllers act on behalf of the corporate board to ensure the 
soundness of reports from the BU to the board. In addition, controllers often have a role to 
support BU management in decision making (Hopper, 1980). As the financial experts of 
the local management team their potential contribution is very relevant. In organisational 
practice this support role has received increased emphasis, to the point that in many 
corporations it is considered the main part of the job (Maas & Matějka, 2009). 
There is a risk that controllers’ involvement with local management influences their 
role as defenders of reporting integrity (Sathe, 1982, 1983). Existing evidence indicates an 
increased emphasis on local responsibilities comes with greater organisational slack 
(Indjejikian & Matějka, 2006; Maas & Matějka, 2009), and pressure from BU managers 
causes controllers to act against explicit corporate policies (Davis, DeZoort, & Kopp, 
2006; Hartmann & Maas, 2010; Lord & DeZoort, 2001). Therefore it is important to know 
what determines a controller’s propensity to compromise on integrity under social pressure 
from BU management. 
We use recent developments in neuroscience to get a view on this. In particular, we 
apply findings and theory on mirror neurons to the organisational problem of controller 
roles. Mirror neurons were first found in macaque monkeys (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992): certain cells in the rostral ventral premotor cortex 
fired both when monkeys made and observed a grasping movement. This provides direct 
support for the perception-action hypothesis (e.g. Allport, 1987; Prinz, 1987), which posits 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on: Eskenazi, P. I., Rietdijk, W. J. R., & Hartmann, F. G. H. Why controllers compromise 
on their fiduciary duties: EEG evidence on the role of the human mirror neuron system. This paper is under 
review at Accounting, Organizations and Society. 
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that “perception and action share a common code of representation in the brain” (Preston 
& De Waal, 2002, p. 9). The discovery of mirror neurons in macaques spurred research 
into a homologue in the human brain (e.g. Decety et al., 1997; Iacoboni, 1999; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), yielding promising results. The human mirror neuron 
system (hMNS) provides a plausible neurological mechanism of imitation (Iacoboni, 
2009). Imitation is a pervasive aspect of human social behaviour (see Lieberman, 2007). It 
is often non-conscious and is important in establishing personal relationships (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999). Central areas of the hMNS (i.e. the IFG and the anterior inferior parietal 
lobule) have been shown to be active during imitation (Iacoboni, 1999; Koski et al., 2002). 
The imitation or simulation of facial expressions is similarly facilitated by the hMNS (e.g. 
Van der Gaag, Minderaa, & Keysers, 2007). In this way the perception of facial 
expressions activates their motoric representations, and purportedly their experience (Carr, 
Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003). 
Importantly, people differ in their sensitivity to the emotions of others (Davis, 1983), 
and this manifests in differences in hMNS activity while observing emotional facial 
expressions (Carr et al., 2003). In Chapter 4 we develop a theory that explains variation in 
controllers’ willingness to compromise on fiduciary duties by variation in hMNS activity. 
On this picture, the sensitivity of controllers to social pressure from BU managers is a 
function of their personal neurological make-up. We examine this theory empirically using 
a survey on professional dilemmas and an EEG recording of professional controllers. We 
find a moderately strong correlation between these measures. This relation is moderated by 
the type of dilemma: it is stronger when BU managers are primarily driven by self-interest 
than when they have non-selfish motives to misreport. 
 
1.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Management accounting is an applied field, affording us the freedom to draw on a mixture 
of conceptual resources. This has often taken the form of economic and psychological 
constructs and theories. A traditional economic or folk-psychological conception of agency 
inherits a view of the human agent as deliberative, intentional, driven by reasons, and 
transparent to him-/herself. We attempt to move towards studying the human agent as a 
natural phenomenon. This is made possible by progress in fields like neuroscience and 
eye-tracking, which by virtue of new measurement methods allow for a more naturalistic 
perspective on the human agent. While the transition is difficult without doubt, we believe 
that naturalised accounting research holds a great promise of relevant and powerful new 
insights for organisations. 
